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Abstract
This study examines differences between users and nonusers of information
communication technologies (ICTs) within the pre-incident planning processes for domestic
terrorist movements operating within the United States. In addition, this study is the first
quantitative exploration of the prevalence, types, and purposes of ICT use within terrorist
movements, specifically environmental, far-right, and Islamic extremist movements. Using
“officially designated” federal terrorism investigations from the American Terrorism Study
(ATS), we analyzed extracted evidence of ICT usage among individuals (n =331) engaged in the
pre-incident planning processes as members of terrorist movements between 1995-2011. While
we find significant differences in terrorist ICT use across terrorist movements, our findings
suggest that demographics are not a strong predictor of usage. We find the highest prevalence of
usage among Islamic movements. However, evidence of online radicalization or recruitment was
found predominantly among environmental movements. We conclude with a discussion of these
findings and their implications for counterterrorism policy.
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Introduction
The advent of information communication technologies (ICTs) at the end of the 20th
century–specifically the convergence and integration of real-time telephone, computer, and
wireless Internet networks–enabled Internet users to access, store, transmit, and manipulate vast
amounts of information. With the creation of the Internet and social networking sites (SNSs),
worldwide access to new information was disseminated around the world. With little distinction
made between “online” and “offline,” new technology has transformed our understanding of
social space. As a result of this dynamic, the impact of ICT use on advancing the development of
social movements harboring divergent ideologies, their access to one another, and their ability to
distribute knowledge of their belief systems via the Internet has emerged as a burgeoning field of
research (Friedland and Rogerson 2009; Garret 2006; Gillet 2003).
Of related importance has been the comprehensive analysis of ICT usage among
grassroots, activist, and social movements, both old and new (Friedland and Rogerson 2009;
Moussa 2011; Saeed, Rohde, and Wulf 2008; Shangapour, Hosseini, and Hashemnejad 2011).
Appropriately, ICT usage among social movements such as terrorist movements has fallen under
a similar scrutiny (Brachman 2006; Frieburger and Crane 2008; Jenkins 2010, 2011; OSCE
2008; Theohary and Rollins 2011; Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011,
2012).
The current analysis seeks to explore the prevalence, types, and purposes of ICT use
within terrorist movements. With the understanding that not all terrorist movements are alike, the
overarching question about how ICTs are used within the pre-incident planning process of
domestic terrorist movements has brought the focus of this research to examine the ICT usage of

1

environmental, far-right, and Islamic extremist movements, the three most prominent terrorist
movements operating in the United States over the past several decades.
The majority of research on ICT usage among the general population is divided between
utopian and dystopian views of Internet use. Aside from the polarized examination and
prediction of its effects, is the surprising absence of any comprehensive analysis of the
characteristics of current ICT “users” and “nonusers” within unique subpopulations of
grassroots, activist, or terrorist movements. Our analysis provides the first known quantitative
examination of terrorist users and nonusers of the Internet within the pre-incident planning
process of domestic terrorists in the United States. ICTs have proven to be powerful tools for
social movements for both practical and social reasons (Coetzee 2008; Earl and Rholinger 2012;
Gillet 2003; Shangapour, Hosseini, and Hashemnejad 2011; Youmans and York 2012). With a
specific focus on terrorists–those who use violence or force against civilians or government to
further a political or social cause–the types and purposes of ICT use have been explored in
nascent literature, assessing both the documented and potential threats from these movements
bearing violent political agendas (Brachman 2006; Frieburger and Crane 2008; Jenkins 2010,
2011; OSCE 2008; Theohary and Rollins 2011; Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012; Weimann
2005, 2010, 2011). The practical use of ICTs to spread information and network among these
social groups has given social movements–those especially stigmatized and violent–a powerful
voice that transcends geographical boundaries.
Users of ICTs among the general population are fundamentally different from nonusers in
terms of their age, education, gender, marital, and socioeconomic status (SES) (Dijk and Hacker
2003; Hlebec et al. 2006; Kwon and Zweizig 2006; Roe and Broos 2005). SES has been one of
the main correlates of ICT adoption and usage from the beginning of the information age
2

(Verdegem and Verhoest 2009). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the same demographic
correlates of those who have both access to and use these technologies may correspond to or
explain differences in ICT usage among terrorist movements. Extreme-left and environmental
movements vary extensively from far-right movements in terms of their demographic
composition. Extensive research shows that Internet users tend to be young (18-34), white,
better-educated, full-time employed males, with considerable access to technology (Aerschot and
Rodousakis 2008; Dholakia 2006; Robinson, Nuestadtl and Kestbbaum 2004; Roe and Broos
2005; Selwyn 2006; Selwyn, Gorard, and Furlong 2005; Verdegem and Verhoest 2009), all of
which reflect the similar demographic composition of far-left and environmental movements. In
contrast, nonusers tend to be under-skilled, less educated, concerned about privacy, have
perceived costs and benefits for obtaining access, or simply may lack the financial resources to
afford connection to the Internet (Aerschot and Rodousakis 2008; Selwyn 2005; Verdegem and
Verhoest 2009). In the same way, these demographic and psychological correlates of nonusers
are similar to members of far-right movements.
Furthermore, among the general population the Internet is primarily used as a means of
communication and information/news dissemination (Cole 2008; Hlebec at al. 2006). The
network neighbors of ICT users are geographically different and play less specialized, more
functional roles in their lives (Hlebec et al. 2006). Accordingly, the geographic and
organizational differences among terrorist movements may also drive differences in types and
purposes of ICT use. The aforementioned literature suggests and supports the notion that the
current research will likely expose varying prevalence rates of ICT use between terrorist
movements for communication, information gathering/sharing, as well as differences in the
demographic composition of users and nonusers of the Internet within the pre-incident planning
3

process. At the fundamental level, movements comprised of younger, better educated members
may drive Internet usage within these movements; movements comprised of less-educated, older
members such as the far-right may translate into less ICT usage due to lack of skills or access.
Nonetheless, usage among terrorists may simply reflect the demographic kinds of differences
among the general population with regard to skills and overall access.
The expanding reach of ICTs and SNSs has aided in the transformation of once
hierarchical terrorist movements into decentralized social movements (Brachman 2006; Jenkins
2010, 2011; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012). This aspect of social life merits not only an
examination of how the Internet is being used by such movements, but how that use varies across
different ideologies. Also important is an examination of the demographic characteristics of
users and nonusers, within and between ideologies. Therefore, the present research intends to
develop new analyses of existing terrorism data in order to gain a better understanding of who is
using the Internet within domestic terrorist movements in the United States, how it is being used
among these movements, and how specific uses vary between these movements. Accordingly,
the analysis examines (1) the extant literature on the demographic correlates of users and
nonusers of ICTs among the general population; (2) the emerging literature on types and
purposes of ICT use among terrorist movements; and (3) the types and purposes of ICT use
among the general population. This literature sets the foundation for the first quantitative
analysis of terrorist users and nonusers of ICTs within the pre-incident planning process of
domestic terrorist plots in the United States, as well as an exploration of the prevalence, types,
and purposes of ICT use across environmental, far-right, and Islamic extremist movements. The
findings will be compared to current literature on the correlates, types, purposes, and
demographics of ICT users and nonusers among the general population, as well as the extant on
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literature on both potential and documented terrorist uses of the Internet, to expand our current
knowledge of both terrorist movements operating within the United States and the potential
threat posed by such ICT usage.
Statement of the Problem
The nature of the potential and argued uses of ICTs among terrorists presents a
significantly important social problem. Between the attacks of 9/11 and the end of 2009 a total of
46 cases of domestic radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism were reported in the
United States (Jenkins 2010). Over the past eleven years, prior research has documented over
170 individuals being indicted or identified in homegrown terrorist plots in the United States
(Jenkins 2011). This research suggests that in many of these cases, radicalized, homegrown
terrorists began their socialization through the Internet. According to aforesaid research, among
Islamic extremist movements, many would-be jihadists appear to have begun their journey on the
Internet in search of justification for grievances, affirmation of anger, solutions to personal
problems, and even “the thrill of clandestine activity” in an epic struggle (Jenkins 2011). This,
and other current research (Theohary and Rollins 2011; Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012;
Weimann 2012), also indicates that by using social networking sites (SNSs) and interactive
websites, the identity of individual and group grievances driving terrorist movements were easily
found and reinforced through social networks of sympathizers as the Internet supported an open,
non-confrontational environment where individuals were more apt to display their true feelings,
emotions, and find an identity. Other literature illustrates that this process may be further
exacerbated when Internet use is combined with face-to-face meetings such as in mosques,
where individuals are indoctrinated and identity is also reinforced (Silber and Bhatt 2007).
Nevertheless, quantitative research measuring the prevalence and role of such ICT use among
5

Islamic extremists or any other movement in relationship to the radicalization process of
terrorists to violent extremism is nearly absent.
Apart from the radicalization of sympathizers, the preceding literature advocates that the
Internet has become a primary medium of disseminating guidance and propaganda among
terrorist movements. Research has found this type of practical use is notably prevalent among
Islamic extremists. It is estimated today that Al-Qa’ida does 99 percent of its own work on the
Internet (Jenkins 2010). Current research has established that terrorist movements, specifically
those that are composed of Islamic extremists, are increasingly using ICTs for strategic
operations to optimize their reach and inspire radicalization to violent extremism (Brachman
2006; Jenkins 2010, 2011; Theohary and Rollins 2011; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012). What
research has not established are prevalence rates of these types and purposes of Internet use
among Islamic extremists, or among other ideologies such as environmental or far-right
movements. Aside from the deficient measures of types and purposes of ICT use across these
ideologies is the lack of quantitative research analyzing the demographic correlates of
movements who use and do not use Internet within terrorist plots. The aforementioned literature
has focused primarily on Al-Qa’ida and Islamic extremist movements, leaving the question open
as to how other movements such as far-right or environmental movements may be using ICTs to
further their cause.
As suggested earlier, the demographic composition of the aforementioned terrorist
movements can vary broadly. Furthermore, the religious and ideological foundations of the farright and Islamic extremist movements differ greatly from those driving environmental or “eco”
terrorists. Accordingly, any assumption that ICT usage in relationship to violent extremism is
limited to a particular philosophy or movements ideology may be potentially misleading given
6

earlier work suggesting important differences found in pre-incident terrorist activity among these
three movements (Fitzpatrick, Smith, Roberts and Damphousse 2013). Admittedly, it remains
challenging to provide comprehensive definitions of environmental, far-right, and Islamic
extremist movements in the U.S., as they each have evolved over the last several decades in
terms of their diverse motives, affiliated movements, and modus operandi. Nonetheless, it is
important to offer broad descriptions of each ideological movement in order to contextualize
anticipated findings of similarities and differences in ICT usage across movements. Thus, this
study relies on Freilich et al. (2014) who undertook a comprehensive review of the literature in
order to derive descriptions of each of the three ideological movements.
First, far-right extremists are described as:
“…fiercely nationalistic, anti-global, suspicious of federal authority and reverent of
individual liberties, especially their right to own guns and be free of taxes. They believe
in conspiracy theories involving imminent threats to national sovereignty or personal
liberty and beliefs that their personal or national ‘way of life’ is under attack. Sometimes
such beliefs are vague, but for some the threat originates from specific racial or religious
groups. They believe that they must be prepared to defend against this attack by
participating in paramilitary training or survivalism” (Freilich et al., 2014, Appendix).
Second, Freilich et al. (2014, Appendix) have defined Islamic extremists as those who:
“…believe that only acceptance of the Islam promotes human dignity. Islamic extremists
reject the traditional Muslim respect for “People of the Book,” (i.e., Christians and Jews).
They believe that “Jihad” (i.e., to struggle in the God’s path like the Prophet
Muhammad), is a defining belief in Islam and includes the “lesser Jihad” that endorses
violence against “corrupt” others. Islamic extremists believe that their faith is oppressed
in nominally Muslim Middle-Eastern/Asian corrupt governments and in nations (e.g.,
Russia/Chechnya) that occupy Islamic populations. The U.S. is seen as supporting the
humiliation of Islam, and exploiting the region’s resources. They believe that America’s
hedonistic culture (e.g., gay-rights, feminism, etc.) negatively affects Muslim values.
Islamic extremists believe that the American people are responsible for their
government’s actions and that there is a religious obligation to combat this assault. They
believe that Islamic law- Sharia- provides the blueprint for a modern Muslim society and
should be forcibly implemented.”
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Third, environmental extremists:
“…endorse biodiversity/biocentric equality (i.e., that humans’ have no legitimate claim to
dominate earth). They believe that the earth and animals are in imminent danger and that
the government and corporations are responsible for this danger that will ultimately result
in the environment’s destruction. These extremists believe that the “system” is incapable
of taking actions to protect the environment and biological diversity. Thus, there is a need
to defend the environment and animals” (Freilich et al., 2014, Appendix).

Due to the lack of available terrorism data, comprehensive quantitative analyses of types,
purposes, and the frequency of ICT and social media usage within pre-incident planning and/or
violent extremism has been absent in the literature (Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2011; Silke
2008). Quantitative data on terrorist use of the Internet in relationship to radicalization is
deficient (Institute for Strategic Dialogue 2011; Meehan, McCants, Weisburd, Jenkins, and
Kohlmann 2011; Myrick, Thompson, Gannon, and Nuemann 2011; Silke 2008). Still,
considerable qualitative and descriptive work has explored both documented and potential types
and purposes of ICT and social media usage among terrorist movements, underscoring the
importance of establishing prevalence rates among these other movements to provide important
insight into this growing body of literature (Brachman 2006; Frieburger and Crane 2008; Jenkins
2010, 2011; OSCE 2008; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Theohary and Rollins 2011; Thompson 2011;
UNODC 2012; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012).
In addition to understanding prevalence rates among movements, also absent from
current literature are quantitative analyses of how the Internet is being used and how this use
may vary between movements. The Internet offers all the practical utility for research,
propaganda, communication, information sharing, claiming responsibility for attacks, training,
target selection, creation of websites, cyber-attacks, publicity, radicalization, threats, and
recruitment (OSCE 2008; Theohary and Rollins 2011;Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012; Weimann
2004, 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012). However, the majority of the work that examines the process of
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radicalization to violent extremism in relationship to ICT use has been either qualitative or
anecdotal and generally lacking systematic comparisons or control group analysis (Myrick et al.
2011; Silke 2008).
To explain the differences in rates and uses within and between movements, the current
research looks to demographic factors for a more complete understanding of what might explain
any variation in use. Quantitative analyses have been performed on a variety of predictors of
Internet use among the general population (Brandtzaeg 2012; Czaja and Lee 2007; Dholakia,
2006; Rodousakis 2008; Ryan and Xenos 2011; Selwyn, Gorard, and Furlong 2005). However,
any connection to terrorist use, or how these might be related to the processes of pre-incident
planning or radicalization to violent extremism, is minimal. Aside from the practical use by such
movements, there may be a deeper connection to understanding how and why these movements
and individuals within these movements use the Internet in general, or more specifically as a tool
for radicalization. Likewise, the three movements being examined (environmental, far-right, and
Islamic extremist) have very different motives and philosophies driving their movements; the
way they use the Internet and social media might vary, particularly given the specific user
characteristics and grievances that they often express. Thus, the current research seeks to create a
demographic typology of users and nonusers of the Internet within domestic terrorist plots while
comparing those findings to those of current studies examining demographic differences among
the general U.S. population.
Study Significance
Over the past several decades, the dynamics of terrorist organizations and movements
have evolved into a multidimensional threat (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Santifort 2012; SPLC
2009). Once understood as a group phenomenon, the leadership and organizational structure of
9

terrorist movements today differ from the once hierarchical, state-sponsored initiatives (Ressler
2006). Inherently, many of these characteristic changes are reflected in both the planning and
outcomes of domestic terrorist plots in the United States. Moving from the pyramidal and “huband-spoke” cell structures found in the 70s and 80s, the concept of “leaderless resistance” was
facilitated and popularized by groups such as the far-right movements in the late 80s and
throughout the 90s. The fundamental concepts underlying the leaderless resistance movement
leveraged on the advantages of autonomous networks or cells of individuals sharing the same
ideology, having no centralized authority or chain-of-command (Leader and Probst 2003). While
the perpetration of terror attacks by individuals is no new phenomenon, there has been a growing
prevalence of terrorist incidents in the United States committed by individuals (Weimann 2012).
These acts have occurred under instruction from others and in rare cases have been the result of
self-radicalization.
During the late 80s and early 90s, far-right leaders such as Louis Beam and David Lane
motivated a resurgence of radical right activity by advocating the leaderless resistance as an
effective strategy for avoiding detection, infiltration, and prosecution by government agencies
(Joosse 2007). By the mid to late 90s, the environmental terrorist movements such as the Animal
Liberation Front (ALF) and Earth Liberation Front (ELF) were also benefiting from a leaderless
resistance operational structure (Leader and Probst 2003). Together, the ALF/ELF coalition
caused damages in excess of $40 million between 1996 and 2002. Combined with the minimal
preparation time required for arson, sabotage, and vandalism as the preferred methods of attack,
the leaderless resistance model allowed ELF to become the most notorious and destructive
“ecoterrorism” movement in the United States by the early 2000s. However, while a multi-
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agency investigation was dismantling the ELF Family’s infrastructure and arresting its members,
the United States experienced an even more destructive terror attack.
As the threats to homeland security and effects of domestic terrorism in the U.S. were
already changing, the landscape of domestic terrorism was dramatically altered even further after
the attacks of September 11, 2001, as movements with similar “bottom-up” strategies surfaced.
Although Al-Qa’ida’s infrastructure was nearly destroyed by U.S. military efforts after the
attack, an Islamic-inspired leaderless resistance evolved and added to an already existing
multidimensional terrorist threat (Jenkins 2010, 2011; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011, 2012; Silber
and Bhatt 2007). Although there are a number of Islamic extremist movements, Al-Qa’ida has
been the focus of much terrorism research. Al-Qa’ida conducts operations in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), Iraq (AQI), and Maghreb (AQIM), among many other regions of the world.
Joining forces with other Islamic movements, threats have emerged internationally and
domestically for the U.S. From allies such as al-Shabab in Somalia, to the Pakistani Taliban who
trained the 2010 Time Square bomber and U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad, the diversification of
domestic terrorist threats is still growing (Bergen, Hoffman, and Tiedemann 2011; U.S
Executive Office of the President 2011, 2011).
The Islamic leaderless movements, as well as other terrorist movements, have manifested
themselves in many different forms. While there is no absolute consensus on how to define the
different forms of “homegrown” radicalization to violent extremism in America, the following
incidents illustrate various ways in which domestic attacks have been organized and carried out
in the U.S. For example, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, with the help of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), attempted an unsuccessful “solo” attack against flight NWA 253 on
Christmas Day, 2009. The 2009 Little Rock recruiting office shooting, perpetrated by
11

Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhamaad, was another example of a solo-attack. It should be noted that
both of these incidents involved prior contact with terrorist operatives. However, the Fort Hood
shooting in 2009, carried out by Nidal Hassan, required no previous contact with operatives at
all. This type of “lone wolf” attack committed by Hassan is an example of the homegrown
radicalization to violent extremism occurring in America that is raising concern. While the
Islamic threat has occupied much of the research and public concern, such concern may have
overshadowed terrorist movements such as those composed of environmental and far-right
members that continue to thrive in the U.S. (Leader and Probst 2003; SPLC 2009). Likewise,
while ICTs have emerged as playing a key role in the process of domestic radicalization here in
the United States, the trends in literature have also focused almost solely on Al-Qa’ida and
Islamic-inspired movements. However, in an IT-driven era, ICTs are viable tools readily
accessible for strategic use among all terrorist movements meriting the necessity of this analysis.
From 2006 to 2012, ICT proliferation grew from 73 percent to 78 percent in the United
States (Czaja and Lee 2007; Internet World Stats 2013). In addition, social networking site
(SNS) usage from 2008 to 2010 grew from 35 percent to 61 percent among the general adult
population (Pew Internet 2010). Currently, the number of SNS users in the world numbers over
1.2 billion with Americans spending 22% of their time on the Internet on these sites (Sheldon
2012). As ICT use expands, social scientists have a unique opportunity to examine differences
between users and nonusers within social movements. Along with these powerful social tools
comes the ability to amplify many aspects of social life. Not only does social life shape the
Internet, but also the Internet is altering society in extraordinary ways, for better or worse. ICTs
are proving to be valuable tools for of improving political engagement, increasing the efficiency
of communication, and increasing productivity (Chinn and Fairlie 2007; Norris 2001;
12

Steinmuller 2001). The Internet is not merely a technology; rather, it possesses different
meanings, purposes, and uses facilitated by differences among individuals and groups (Sewlyn
2006).
Accordingly, culture plays an important role in the way both individuals and groups
adopt technology (Anandarajan, Igbaria, and Anakwe 2002; Ein-Dor, Segev, and Orgad 1993;
Kumar, Ganesh and Echambadi 1998; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Schepers and Wetzels 2007;
Straub, Keil, and Brenner 1997; Takada and Jain 1991), specifically the Internet (Pavlou and
Chai 2002). Just as culture plays an important role in the adoption of ICTs in certain countries,
the same applies to social movements, such as the aforementioned terrorist movements, and
therefore adoption of ICT usage may differ depending on the users’ origins, ideologies, and
philosophies. As the social world changes with the technological innovations around ICTs, it has
become important to understand how these technologies may be influencing terrorist outcomes.
Finally, previous research on tools used by terrorists in the incident planning process has
focused primarily on explosives (Nambayah and Quickenden 2004; Ronald 2003; Slater and
Trunkey 1997; Smith, Damphousse, and Roberts 2006); however, few studies have empirically
evaluated the Internet as a terrorist tool. Furthermore, although “homegrown” terrorist activity
may not be as prevalent as group oriented activity, theorists continue to argue that attacks by
movements and by lone individuals will be more complex and sophisticated with the use of ICTs
(Nesser 2012). In an era of IT-driven globalization, the expansion and use of these tools around
the world to effectively further the cause of violent extremists has made terrorism an important
social problem. ICTs have not only contributed to the globalization of information, they have
also contributed to the globalization of terrorism (Hutchinson 2006). The targeting of vulnerable
communities/individuals is a growing problem. Radicalization and counter-radicalization
13

initiatives at the Federal, state, and local levels are needed to prevent the recruitment and
radicalization of individuals to violence (U.S. Executive Office of the President 2011, 2011).
There is a specific need for research and initiatives by nongovernmental organizations (Myrick et
al. 2011). Accordingly, recent academic and policy research has both been developed and been
solicited in order to counter radicalization to violent extremism in the United States (U.S.
Executive Office of the President 2011, 2011). A key aspect of such policymaking and research
is aimed at understanding the vulnerable communities and/or individuals who may either use the
Internet as a tool to recruit or be recruited. There is an evident and growing need to understand
how communities and/or individuals use the Internet. Along with assessing these communitylevel threats comes the necessity to educate the public. Ideologically, the movements under
examination are very different as the aforementioned literature purports, and the Internet is an
important social extension of social movements and must be thoroughly understood.

Review of Literature
The current research requires a focus on three primary bodies of literature that help
delineate the complex processes of ICT usage among and between various terrorist movements:
1) correlates or “predictors” of ICT users and nonusers among the general population, 2) terrorist
use of the Internet from both a practical and psychological perspective, and 3) types and
purposes of ICT use among the general population.
Characteristics of ICT Use among the General Population
To increase understanding of those who use ICTs within the pre-incident planning
process of domestic terrorist plots first requires a general understanding of ICT usage among the
general population. Within this context, this review begins with an examination of the impact of
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ICT and SNS use on societies and individuals to understand the fundamental conditions from
which the majority of ICT savvy individuals and societies operate. After this, predictors,
motives, and social needs that distinguish Internet users from nonusers are reviewed. Again, any
relationship between correlates of Internet use among the general population and those among
terrorist movements have not been explored. Finally, the current qualitative literature that has
inspired the quantitative analysis and variable selection for this study is reviewed with a specific
focus on how this literature can explain individual and group variations in prevalence, type, and
purpose of Internet use.
General ICT Use and Impact
ICT and SNS proliferation in the United States continues to increase significantly each
year (Czaja and Lee 2007; Internet World Stats 2013; Pew Internet 2010). Sociological research
on their use, nonuse, and impact on society is expanding as quickly as these technologies
pervade social life. While much of the prior research focuses on the positive and negative effects
of Internet use upon individuals, there is a growing body of literature on how ICTs, such as
social networking sites (SNSs), have become powerful social tools and human culture and
society (Hlebec, Manfreda, and Vehovar 2006). Accordingly, these technologies possess
different meanings, purposes, and uses facilitated by differences between individuals and groups
(Sewlyn 2006).The unique placeless environment within cyberspace, combined with
asynchronous forms of communication fostered by ICTs, makes them powerful tools with the
ability to amplify many aspects of social life. Not only has society shaped the Internet and its
uses, the Internet continues to transform social life in extraordinary ways–some for better and
some for worse–justifying much of the concern around online radicalization and selfradicalization.
15

Interest in and promotion of ICT use around the world has been spawned by the prospect
of harnessing the power of these tools to improve cultural, social, and human capital (Chinn and
Fairlie 2007; Norris 2001; Steinmuller 2001). Early research on ICT use facilitated rather
dystopian views, correlating Internet use to loneliness, depression, lower self-esteem,
introversion, as well as displacement of social networks and activities (Kraut et al. 1998;
Korkeila, Kaarlas, Jaaskelainen, Vahlberg, and Taiminen 2010). Nonetheless, the impact of ICT
use has changed as quickly as the developments of ICT itself. Current research refutes many of
those early claims, showing ICT use has limited impact on psychological well-being and can
actually be viewed as an extension of social relationships, increasing interpersonal
communication (Chen and Persson 2002; Hlebec et al. 2010). ICTs increase international and
geographic knowledge, awareness of world problems, have benefited disadvantaged minorities,
allowing them to change their social standing, transforming users both psychologically and
emotionally (Beaudon 2008). Latinos and African Americans are among the fastest growing
population of users (Cole 2004). As ICTs have taken the place of traditional media, most users
access the Internet for news and information. This trend has remained the same over the past
decade, while an increase in Internet use for social networking has increased (Cole 2004; Hlebec
et al. 2010; Korkeila et al. 2010). Online communication serves purposes different from those
engaged in offline communications. The Internet is used more for functional purposes, which
tend to be more task-oriented and impersonal. Although intensive Internet use is linked to
spending less time on some activities such as sleep and work (Korkeila et al. 2010), it appears
that ICT use does not displace important social activities but augments communication and
social networking (Robinson and Martin 2009). Overall, ICT users tend to have healthy lives,
sleep a little less, and participate in a little more physical activity.
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Conversely, there are contexts in which ICT usage has not yet penetrated into the lives of
individuals and communities. Therefore, understanding the background characteristics of the
differences between those who use ICTs and those who do not among the general population is
paramount to extrapolating why terrorist individuals and movements may or may not use ICTs in
the incident planning process. Given the Internet’s ability to enhance many aspects of social life,
it becomes apparent that users are characteristically different from nonusers. The next section
assesses the specific differences between users and nonusers of ICTs within the general
population to further infer the likely parallels between this population and the population of
terrorists selected for this analysis.
ICT Users and Nonusers
ICT users are intrinsically and fundamentally different from nonusers in terms of their
age, education, gender, marital status, and socioeconomic status, which all have an impact on the
probability of using the Internet, making demographics an important and often strong predictor
(Dijk and Hacker 2003; Hlebec et al. 2006; Kwon and Zweizig 2006; Roe and Broos 2005).
SES has been one of the main correlates of ICT adoption and usage from the beginning of the
information age (Verdegem and Verhoest 2009). Again, comprehensive research shows that
Internet users tend to be young (18-34), white, better-educated, full-time employed males, with
considerable access to technology (Aerschot and Rodousakis 2008; Dholakia 2006; Robinson,
Nuestadtl and Kestbbaum 2004; Roe and Broos 2005; Selwyn 2006; Selwyn, Gorard, and
Furlong 2005; Verdegem and Verhoest 2009). The social networks of ICT users are different
than those of nonusers, facilitating qualitatively different interpersonal roles for users (Hlebec et
al. 2006). Men, persons 30 years of age or younger, use the Internet more for chatting and
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discussion and have shown a higher tendency to be addicted to the Internet (Korkeila et al.).
However, the gender gap in ICT usage has narrowed over the last several years (Selwyn 2006).
In contrast, nonusers tend to be under-skilled, less educated, concerned about privacy,
have perceived costs and benefits for obtaining access, or simply may lack the financial
resources to afford connection to the Internet (Aerschot and Rodousakis 2008; Selwyn 2005;
Verdegem and Verhoest 2009). Elderly people have the lowest adoption rate and level of use of
information communication technologies among all age categories (Flanagan and Metzger
2001). Social structure and the personal circumstances of individuals seem to drive use overall
(Selwyn et al. 2005). At the macro-level, not only income, but regulatory effectiveness,
telecommunications infrastructure, and human capital drive use of the Internet (Chinn and Fairlie
2007; Dasgupta 2001; Wallsten 2005). However, overall, income seems to drive Internet use
among industrialized nations (Chinn and Fairlie 2007; OECD 2001; US Department of
Commerce 2002; Quibria et al. 2003). Given the considerable research on what drives ICT use, a
significant body of literature is also growing pertaining to users and nonusers of social media.
SNS Users and Nonusers
Social networking sites (SNSs) allow users to articulate and control a perception of their
private lives to the public (Haythornthwaite 2005). Many introverted and lonely people with low
levels of self-esteem, who seek to build these online social networks, are dissatisfied with
traditional face-to-face interactions (Ong, Chang, and Wang 2011; Sheldon 2012); these sites
substitute for traditional face-to-face interaction. These sites also offer unique networking
opportunities to gain social approval and express opinions among its users (Gangadharbatla
2008). The SNS with the most profound effect to date is Facebook, a “Six-Degree-Separation”
social networking site (6SNS) that allows users to maintain weak, but more effective ties in
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terms of enhancing social activities and information sharing (Shu and Chuang 2011). Weak ties
have actually been shown to be more effective for instrumental purposes such as finding
employment or obtaining other important information (Hlebec et al. 2010; Shu and Chuang
2011). Similar to the research on traditional ICT use, current research finds no relationship
between time spent using SNSs and size of social networks, or differences between network size
or emotional closeness to others between users and nonusers (Pollet, Roberts, and Dunbar 2011).
However, one recent study did find that male SNS users are lonelier than female users and
nonusers, but overall users showed a significant increase in number of acquaintances and social
capital (Brandtzaeg 2012). Other research has found interesting correlations between SNS use
self-promoting and superficial behaviors, such as posting photos and writing status updates
(Buffardi and Campbell 2008, Mehdizadeh 2010). In addition, research in the same vein is
finding that users of 6SNSs such as Facebook have higher levels of total narcissism,
exhibitionism, and leadership then nonusers (Ryan and Xenos 2011). Unlike general Internet use,
SNSs have been used more by women than men (Sheldon 2012). Tufekci (2008) found that the
best predictors of not using SNSs were male; concerns about personal security, less need to
engage in social browsing, and instrumental versus expressive preferences for Internet use. Age
is also a predictor with the most active users of SNSs being millennials (18-34) followed by
teens (12-17). Sheldon (2012) found that age was the best predictor of nonuse; this work also
found that the average age of nonusers of SNSs was 35.
As illustrated, interest in, and promotion of ICT use around the world has spawned
considerable research and quantitative analyses on a variety of predictors of Internet use among
the general population. However, any connection to terrorist use of the Internet, or how these
correlates might drive the processes of radicalization to violent extremism is minimal. Again,
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there may be a deeper connection to understanding how and why both groups and individuals,
terroristic, or civilian, use the Internet in general, or as a tool, or are radicalized by those who do
so. Likewise, the three movements being examined (environmental, far-right, and Islamic
extremist) may have very different motives and philosophies driving their movements; the way
they use the Internet and social media may also differ given the specific user characteristics
found and grievances expressed. Therefore, the next section moves from use and nonuse among
the general population to both the documented and potential terroristic uses of the Internet. After
establishing the correlates of use and nonuse among these three movements, the goal is to
extrapolate why and how terrorists are using the Internet and what factors might drive
differences in ICT usage across terrorist movements.
Terrorist Use of the Internet: Prevalence and Type
To expound on the work described in the previous section and increase the understanding
of ICT usage among terrorist movements, the current research additionally requires focus on
three primary literatures that help delineate the complex processes of ICT usage among and
between various terrorist movements: 1) prevalence of Internet use among terrorist movements,
2) terrorist use of the Internet from a practical perspective, and 3) terrorist use of the Internet
from a psychological perspective. Moving from literature on the individual demographic
characteristics of users and nonusers, the goal is to examine the potential and documented
terrorist uses of ICTs, drawing inferences from factors that may drive differences in use across
movements.
Prevalence of Use
As mentioned above, previous research has both documented and argued that ICT use,
with a specific focus on Islamic extremist movements such as Al-Qa’ida, has become an
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essential terrorist tool for disseminating guidance and propaganda (Jenkins 2010). While this
research has primarily focused on the locus of Internet use within Islamic extremist
radicalization, it has failed to examine the same process occurring in other domestic terrorist
incidents or plots. Although terrorists can be categorized as radicals committing violent acts with
the goal of achieving a broader social or political change, their ideologies, methods of
recruitment, and targets have been very different (LaFree and Bersani 2012; Smith and Morgan
1994). It is likely that these differences are reflected in their ICT usage as well. Moreover, with
the recent return and diversification of far-right extremism (SPLC 2009), data on Internet usage
in the pre-incident planning and radicalization processes among movements other than Islamicinspired extremists is needed to assess threat levels among these movements while at the same
time creating proactive counterterrorism strategies proportionately.
Practical Use
For many terrorists, the Internet offers the practical utility of research, propaganda,
communication, information sharing, claiming responsibility for attacks, training, target
selection, creation of websites, cyber-attacks, publicity, radicalization, threats, and recruitment
(OSCE 2008; Theohary and Rollins 2011;Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012; Weimann 2005,
2010, 2011). The Internet provides an efficient use of information gathering and sharing. From
accessing the coordinates of a target’s location on Google Maps to the distribution of bombmaking instruction manuals, the efficiency of the planning and communication process of
terrorists has become increasingly accurate, and ICTs have facilitated in changing the rules of the
game. Additionally, current research has suggested that new social media is being readily used to
disseminate propaganda, reach and train group members, and aid in terrorists’ ability to
radicalize individuals (Brachman 2006; Freiburger and Crane 2008; Jenkins 2010, 2011;
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Theohary and Rollins 2011; Thompson 2011; UNODC 2012; Weimann 2005, 2010, 2011); the
Internet and new media offer an expanding list of tools for terroristic use.
In addition to practical purposes of general Internet usage, new social media offers
radicals a way to promote the agenda of their movement and its often-complicated ideology. In
the case of homegrown violent extremists, terrorism appears to be as much an expression of an
identity as it is an ideology, and the Internet contains an ample supply of imagery, music, and
text from which the aspiring terrorist can assemble a developing identity (Meehan, McCants,
Weisburd, Jenkins, and Kohlmann 2011). Within social networking sites (SNSs), it is now easier
to communicate with others and assimilate into almost any social network than it ever was
before. Currently, researchers have found that 90 percent of terrorist activities on the Internet
take place using SNSs, including independent bulletin boards, Paltalk, Yahoo or eGroups
(Weimann 2010). The dramatic growth in the number of jihadist websites and chat rooms,
especially the significant increase in English-language sites in this category from a handful to
hundreds, has made the narrative and message of violent jihad more accessible and compelling to
those who cannot read or speak Arabic (Jenkins 2010).
With the increased popularity of SNSs such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube over the
past decade, a new social network environment and potential threat for terrorist activity has
emerged. This environment is clearly conducive to expanding the reach of social networks, but it
holds potential to amplify violent extremism (Klausen, Barbieri, Reichlin-Melnick, and Zelin
2012). These three SNSs in particular can offer terrorists the advantage of real-time updates,
access to personal information, information sharing, and training capabilities worldwide. For
example, YouTube is not merely a video-hosting site, but also a formidable social networking
forum that can effectively promote violent acts, broadcast threats, and announce as well as direct
22

events and demonstrations (Meehan et al. 2011). Again, these potential uses justify potential
concern and threats of such use.
With over 1.2 billion active users on Facebook, this SNS has been shown to pose a
formidable threat to national security and is hard to regulate due to the First Amendment
protection of US-based ISPs (Weimann 2010). Terrorists have been documented using
Facebook to establish friendships through the “narrow casting” strategy by using the name,
accompanying default image, and information on a group message board that were all tailored to
fit the profile of particular social groups (Weimann 2001; 2010). Facebook also contains
personal information about individuals, which poses security threats to military operations. In
addition to compromising soldiers’ accounts, Twitter with its now 500 million plus users poses a
similar, but in some ways, unique threat. For example, Twitter enables terrorists to send and
receive near real-time updates on the logistics of troops’ movements in order to conduct more
successful ambushes (Weimann 2011). Perhaps a more realistic threat is Twitter’s political
environment and asynchronous communication environment, which also has the potential to
foster radical narrative.
All SNSs considered, the Internet holds various powerful methods of communicating and
expanding social networks. Considering the far-reaching practicality of SNSs along with
literature on Al-Qa’ida’s usage of SNSs, it is likely that while Al-Qa’ida and associated Islamic
extremist movements may be the most prevalent ICT users for communication and social
networking, environmental and far-right movements may have adopted or developed similar ICT
use strategies unique to the goals of their ideology. Research shows that movements are
becoming aware of this capacity and even modeling their SNSs with similar design and logos to
market their brand (Weimann 2011). For example, terrorists have been documented branding
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their own versions of video sharing sites modeled after YouTube. Creating their own websites
and linking them with a domain name allows the posting and cross-posting of radical content
with less chance of detection or removal. Therefore, it is crucial to examine all types of SNS and
Internet usage may occur in the pre-incident planning process. The current study addresses the
prevalence of these issues.
Psychological Use
In addition to the practical usage of ICTs and SNSs, literature has also examined the
psychological use and effects associated with radicalization and Internet usage (Brachman 2006;
Freiburger and Crane 2008; Jenkins 2011; Silber and Bhatt 2007). The emergent theme from this
literature conveys the notion that the Internet is a powerful developmental tool, which can be
used by terrorists to spread ideology and propaganda quickly and effectively, while reaching and
influencing aggrieved sympathizers by using multiple learning models (Freiburger and Craine
2008; O’Shaughnessy and Baines 2009). Most important, evidence shows that Internet
propaganda, along with other tools, can be used to imbue vulnerable individuals, who may be
experiencing feelings of alienation or marginalization as well as personal and group grievances,
with radical narrative, making them more susceptible to perpetrating acts of expressive violence
(Bartlett, Birdwell, and King 2010; Silber and Bhatt 2007).
Clearly, the story is more complicated, and its completeness has been hampered by a
general lack of terrorism data, as it relates to Internet usage. The current study provides and
assesses comprehensive terrorism data on the roles of usage and its impact on the overall process
of radicalization. In sum, terrorism research may need to assess organizing threat and mobility
differently. Collective action has been changed and now extends into the placeless environment
that contains all the practical and psychological tools beneficial to any business, organization, or
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movement. The ability of ICTs and SNSs to radicalize, empower, and mobilize followers of
terrorist movements cannot be ignored. With the ever-expanding capabilities of these
technologies, these movements can clearly benefit from developments in research, training,
communication, and recruitment. Nevertheless, the prior research claims about the prevalence,
types, and purposes of Internet use within domestic terrorist plots within the United States need
to be assessed empirically.
Theory and Evidence Overview
To empirically examine the prevalence, type, and purpose of ICT usage among these
movements requires an understanding of why characteristic group differences in ICT usage
might exist beyond the individual composition of movement membership. Given that both the
personal circumstances of individuals combined with social structure seem to drive use overall
(Selwyn et al., 2005), it seems likely that demographic, ideological, and cultural factors all
coalesce in shaping ICT use among terrorists.
Among the general population, ICTs are mainly used as a means of communication and a
way to highlight news and information (Cole, 2008; Hlebec et al., 2006). SNSs are primarily
used as a form of expression for those who prefer not to socialize face-to-face (Tufekci, 2008).
Overall, income seems to drive ICT use among industrialized nations (Chinn and Fairlie, 2007;
OECD, 2001; US Department of Commerce, 2002); nevertheless, at the macro-level, not only
income, but regulatory effectiveness, telecommunications infrastructure, and human capital drive
use of ICTs (Chinn and Fairlie, 2007; Dasgupta, 2001; Wallsten, 2005). Beyond this, there has
been a need to examine cultural factors in addressing the use and adoption of technology
(Bagozzi, 2007; Gretzel, Myughwa, and Lee, 2008; Okazaki, 2005). Culture plays an important
role in the way both individuals and groups adopt technology (Anandarajan, Igbaria, and
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Anakwe, 2002; Ein-Dor, Segev, and Orgad, 1993; Kumar, Ganesh, and Echambadi, 1998;
Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Schepers and Wetzels, 2007; Straub, Keil, and Brenner, 1997;
Takada and Jain, 1991), specifically ICTs (Pavlou and Fygenson, 2006). Overall, U.S.
consumers spend more time on the Internet and more time creating content than any of their
counterparts (Gretzel, Myughwa, and Lee, 2008). Just as culture plays an important role in the
adoption of ICTs in certain countries, the same may be true within terrorist movements. Lowcontext cultures such as the U.S. differ from high-context, collectivist cultures in terms of their
communication needs and styles (Gretzel, Myughwa, and Lee, 2008); therefore, although
differing in many respects, it is likely that Western culture predominantly affects the needs and
motives for ICT use/adoption among movements operating within the United States. The
practical and culturally driven needs for ICT usage among the general population allow for a
deeper understanding of how these factors combine with individual characteristics of users, thus
producing differences in ICT use across terrorist movements.
Contribution of Research
Accordingly, the current analysis possesses myriad practical implications for counterradicalization and counterintelligence strategies, as well as academic research and public policy
initiatives. The next section briefly discusses the merits and contributions to both the
governmental and nongovernmental field of research on online radicalization to violent
extremism in the United States. The data currently available from the American Terrorism Study
(ATS) (i.e. Smith and Damphousse 2013) should assist to remedy the lack of empirical work in
two ways. First, this project should facilitate the delineation of the impact and difference of types
and purposes of ICT use among these three movements during pre-incident activity, as well as
within the process of radicalization leading to violent extremism. Second, it will systematically
26

examine demographics of individual and movement members among Internet users and
nonusers, potentially creating a typology to compare to the general population of the United
States. The ATS database allows for the study of persons indicted at the federal level for official
acts of terrorism and terrorism-related charges from 1980 through 2012. For this specific
analysis, from 1995-2011, these court cases provide a population of over 320 indictees for an
exploratory study of Internet usage, frequency of use, type of use, and purpose of use in the preincident planning processes, as well as individual background information.
The results from this study may have significant impacts both on policy and practice.
Unlike traditional criminal behavior, terrorism occurs over long periods of time, across multiple
geographic units, involving complicated social networks with both direct and indirect contact,
among persons engaging in numerous pre-incident activities. Inherently, the Internet has
perceivably both changed and enhanced these processes. The results from this analysis will assist
both the practitioner and policymaker to better understand the process of Internet usage within
domestic terrorist plots in the United States. This analysis explores new ground in quantifying
practical and psychological types of Internet use; there are few if any studies that have attempted
to quantify the process within the context of domestic terrorism using these specific constructs.
At present, there is no single study that has quantified and/or examined the pattern of
Internet usage among domestic terrorists or terrorist movements. It is the goal of this study to not
only put use/non-use in the context of how domestic terrorists compare to the general population,
but also how those patterns are different across three major terrorist movements. The current
research maintains that while much of the focus of law enforcement and intelligence agencies
has been on the online activities of Islamic extremist movements, other terrorist movements have
been using the Internet and social media to communicate with one another. A more
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comprehensive approach to analyzing this data between movements should be of great benefit to
those agencies wanting to know more about the who, what, where and how of radicalization and
pre-incident planning facilitated by the Internet.
It has been established that Islamic extremist movements are using ICTs and SNSs for
many of the aforementioned purposes; however, it has not been established whether or not uses
such as these are prevalent among other movements, or how prevalent they are within Islamic
extremist movements. Measuring types and purposes of use, combined with individual and group
correlates of users and nonusers will allow for a more comprehensive understanding of this
phenomenon as it occurs within different terrorist movements. The following analysis provides
and assesses comprehensive terrorism data on the roles of ICT usage within the pre-incident
planning process of domestic terrorists. In addition, the analysis both attempts to answer and
raise certain questions pertaining to the threat of online self-radicalization occurring in the
United States. In sum, terrorism research needs to assess organizing threat and mobility
differently. With ICTs, the dynamics of collective action have perceivably been changed and
now extend into the placeless environment that contains all the practical and psychological tools
beneficial to any business, organization, or movement. The ability of ICTs and SNSs to
radicalize, empower, and mobilize followers of terrorist movements cannot be ignored; however,
prevalence of threat has never been quantitatively assessed. With the ever-expanding capabilities
of these technologies, these movements may clearly benefit from developments in research,
training, communication, and recruitment.

28

Data and Methods
To address each of the separate issues previously raised in literature on users/nonusers of
ICTs and terroristic use of the Internet within the pre-incident planning process, the present
analysis uses court documents and other open-source documentation from “officially designated”
Federal terrorism court cases pertaining to movements operating in the United States (Smith et
al., 2006; Smith et al., 2008). Documents from each of the federal terrorism cases are maintained
as part of the American Terrorism Study (ATS). The ATS dataset currently contains information
on nearly 4,000 precursor activities related to 437 incidents and planned incidents from 1971 to
2013. Information over 400 variables from these cases have been extracted from the court
records and quantified for empirical analyses.
It has been established that terrorism requires more extensive preparation than that of
traditional criminality (Smith et al., 2006; 2008). This planning process has been streamlined by
ICTs, and recruitment appears to have been enhanced by online social media (Brachman, 2006;
O’neil and Gray, 2011; Saeed, Rohde, and Wulf, 2008; Thompson, 2011). The variables
pertaining to these issues were related to the use of ICTs within the pre-incident planning process
among environmental, far-right, and Islamic extremist movements. In addition, quantitative
measures of type and purpose of ICT use, as well as the background characteristics of
users/nonusers were established to quantify correlates and variation in the aforementioned
measures within and between ideological movements.
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Measurement
Use and Demographics
The current project focuses only on the years 1995-2011. The Internet officially became
“commercial” in 1995 with the advent of Internet Service Providers (ISP’s). Therefore, this
exploratory analysis focused not only on the first decade of the 21st century, but when the
Internet came onto the commercial market. Thus, the present analysis extracted information for
all known terrorist incident plots with a conviction (court case) since 1995 (n = 149). The ATS
data reveal that multiple actors were involved in both plots and incidents as reflected in the
indictments and open-source documentation. Therefore, demographic information on all known
persons indicted in each incident plot and act (indictees) (n = 331) were collected as
demographic measures, which include the following: Age (1 = 1, 99 = 99 years of age); Sex (0 =
female); Race (0 = white); Marital Status (0 = married); and Education (0 = less than high
school). Use is also an independent measure User/Nonuser (0 = User) to establish demographic
correlates of ICT Use.
It should be noted that this measurement does not include individual “co-conspirators”
who were allegedly involved in the plot but were not indicted. All court cases selected represent
terrorist plots where an incident act was carried-out, whether successful or failed. The court cases
and individuals were then assigned to categories or movements representing the associated
terrorist movement name or ideology in association with a specific terrorist incident: (case study)
(n = 86).
Variation between Terrorist Movements
Next, the differences in both ICT use and demographics between terrorist movements
were examined with (1) the independent measure of Terrorist Movement (1 = environmental, 2 =
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far-right, and 3 = Islamic extremist); and (2) the dependent measure of variation of use (0 = Yes)
between terrorist movement. Demographic correlates of User/Nonuser (0 = User) and the
variation across movements were then examined: Age (1 = 1, 99 = 99 years of age), Sex (0 =
female), Race (0 = white); Marital Status (0 = married), Education (0 = less than high school),
and Terrorist Movement (1 = environmental, 2 = far-right, and 3 = Islamic extremist). In
addition, Use (0 = Yes) was used as a measure of the overall prevalence of ICT use among
movements.
These variables allow for the creation of measures and examination of: 1) the overall
prevalence of Use across terrorist movements; 2) the variation of the Demographics across
terrorist movements; and 3) the variation of Use across terrorist movements.
Terrorist Use by Prevalence, Type, and Purpose
After establishing measures of prevalence, demographic correlates, and variance among
those correlates across movements, a dependent measure of Use Type (1 = information gathering,
2 = distribution of propaganda, 3 = communication, 4 = planning and coordination, 5 =
information sharing, 6 = claiming responsibility for attacks, 7 = training, 8 = target selection, 9 =
website creation, 10 = cyber-attacks, 11 = publicity, 12 = the radicalization of civilians, 13 =
terroristic threatening, 14 = recruitment, 15 = fund raising, 16 = performance analysis, 17 =
disinformation, 18 = remote attack, 19 = information security, or 20 = use of the internet as a tool
for inspiration/indoctrination) within and between movements was used to assess the most
prevalent type of ICT usage and whether Use Type varied significantly across terrorist
movements.
These comparisons allowed for demographic and typological measures that can be
compared to correlates of Use and Type of Use across the general non-terrorist population,
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further expanding the breadth of knowledge about special populations of terrorists and associated
movements.
Estimating Internet Usage
The last segment of the analysis offers two logistic regression models measuring the
likelihood of various factors predicting odds of usage. The independent demographic measures
Age (1 = 1, 99 = 99 years of age), Sex (0 = female), Race (0 = white); and Marital Status (0 =
married) and the independent measure of Terrorist Movement (0 Islamic extremist, 1 =
environmental, 2 = far-right) were used in these exploratory models.
As a result, the present analysis focuses on four primary questions/issues: 1)
Demographic correlates of Internet users and nonusers from the terrorist sample in relationship
to the general population; 2) A description of type of Internet usage for the entire terrorist
sample; 3) The differences in Internet usage across the three terrorist movements (environmental,
far-right, and Islamic extremist); and 4) The differences in types and purposes of Internet usage
across these movements.
Analytic Framework
The current analysis begins with an examination of the demographics and overall
prevalence of Internet use between movements. This allowed for the first quantitative analysis of
variance of ICT use among environmental, far-right, and Islamic terrorist movements within the
pre-incident planning process. Given that these three emergent terrorist threats varied
demographically, it also allowed for a comparison of the demographics of “users” and
“nonusers” to the research findings on those correlates among the general population. Given the
differences emergent between movements, an analysis of variance among users and nonusers
was then employed to assess both how ICT use varies across movements, and how demographics
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vary across movements. Reviewing the extant literature on terrorist use of the Internet created
the more complicated question about how and what terrorists are using ICTs. Therefore, two
binomial logistic regression models were used to assess terrorist demographics across movement
to determine what demographics drive Internet usage, as well as to explain differences in use and
type of use across terrorist movement.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
To begin with, over the 16-year period examined in the present analysis, over half (55%)
of the cases that were prosecuted were found to contain clear evidence of ICT usage related to
the incident (either preparatory or target specific). Table 1 provides measures of the prevalence
of Internet use, demographics, group types, as well as how ICTs were used during the planning
process of domestic terrorist plots in the United States from 1995 to 2011. In the case of
“claiming responsibility” for an attack, this generally occurred after the incident was carried out,
though in some cases the communiqués were started before the incident was carried out. For the
entire sample (n = 331), the average age of movement members was 35 years old. Affirming
previous research on terrorist demographics, the majority of members were married (47%), white
(68%) males (86%) possessing more than a high school education (68%) with very few (3.5%)
having less than a high school education. The categories representing the terrorist movements
examined–environmental (30%), far-right (35%), and Islamic extremist (34%)–were relatively
proportionate across the sample. Additionally, while not shown in the tables, it was found that
eighty-three percent of Islamic extremist were ICT users, followed by environmental (51%) and
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Demographics & Model Variables (n = 331)
%
Mean
Dependent Variable
Use

S.D.

55.30%

Demographics
Age
Sex (0 = Male )
Race (0 = White )
Marital (0 = Married)
Education (0 = Less than HS )

86.20%
67.80%
47.10%
3.50%

Movement
Environmental
User %
Far-Right
User %
Islamic Extremist
User %

30.51%
51.49%
35.05%
31.03%
34.44%
83.33%

Types of Use
Communication
Info Gathering
Propaganda
Planning
Train
Info Sharing
Claim
Publicity
Threatening
Web Creation
Recruitment
Target
Cyber-Attack
Radicalization

42.90%
35.60%
32.30%
15.40%
13.30%
12.10%
12.10%
9.70%
8.20%
6.60%
6.00%
3.30%
2.10%
1.80%

34.62

34

13.539

far-right (31%). For all movements, communication (43%) was the most common use during the
planning process, followed by information gathering (36%) and propaganda (32%). Overall, it
appears that far-right movements used ICTs far less than both Islamic and environmental
movements, while Islamic and environmental movements have similar frequencies of usage
generally. Clearly, domestic terrorist movements used the Internet extensively for practical or
strategic purposes during the planning process. Table 2 provides measures of the demographic
and category differences between users and nonusers for the entire sample (n = 331). There was
no significant difference in age between users (35) and nonusers (35). Overall, the demographics
of ICT users from the entire sample were much like the general demographics for all terrorists,
making it hard to infer a specific “typology.” Users were most likely to be white (26%) males
(49%) who were married (29%) and well educated (44%). Race, gender, and educational
attainment coincide with findings among ICTs in the general population; however, unlike
general population demographics, age was not a good predictor of ICT usage in the sample.
Therefore, it was found that some of the same predictors of ICT use among the general
population may not apply to the sample terrorist population. Of the movements represented, the
analysis again illustrates Islamic extremists (29%) were the heaviest users as a movement within
the entire sample, followed by environmental (15%) and then far-right (11%). The percentage
measures of use and nonuse across demographics and within each of the categories of terrorist
movements is also listed.
Table 3 depicts the differences in types of use between terrorist movement types. Within
those who used ICTs, Islamic extremists used more than other movements for communication
(60%), information gathering (64%), distributing propaganda (54%), and planning (53%).
Cramer’s V was exceptionally strong between movement types, information gathering, and
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communication. These results are in accordance with the extensive qualitative work on potential
terrorist uses of Internet by Islamic extremists (Freiburger and Crane, 2008; Jenkins, 2010, 2011;
UNODC, 2012; Theohary and Rollins, 2011; Weimann, 2004, 2005, 2010, 2011,
2012;)However, within those that used the Internet during the incident planning process,
environmental movements used ICTs more than Islamic extremists for recruiting (100%),
information sharing (60%), training (54%), and radicalization (67%). Aside from domestic
recruitment of members in the U.S., which occurred strictly within environmental movements,
Islamic extremists still maintained a prevalence of ICT use for training (45%), information
sharing (17%), and radicalization (33%) that was significantly lower than that of environmental
movements. Finally, and also unique to environmental movements, ICTs were being used to
claim responsibility for attacks (100%) and using the Internet for cyber-attacks (100%).
Although not always occurring specifically within the pre-incident planning process–although
some of these ELF/ALF communiqués were started before an incident–this use of media is still
an important representation of how movements might use ICTs to further their cause. All of
these findings were statistically significant (Chi-Square) except for radicalization.
Table 4 provides the binomial logistic regression results estimating ICT usage. For model
1, despite the descriptive statistics showing that the age of terrorist movement Internet users and
nonusers was not statistically significant, the results of the regression analysis show that ICTs
users were more likely to be younger. In addition, users are less likely to be females, five times
more likely to be white, and almost 3 times more likely to be married. However, only race is
significant. After introducing the terrorist movement types in model 2, I see that the age is no
longer significant in the model. This supports the previous findings that the age between terrorist
users and nonusers is not a good predictor of ICT use. The explained variance in model 2 is
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Table 2. Demographics and Movement Differences Between Users and Nonusers (n = 331)
Use

Nonuse

34.69

34.55

%

p.

Demographics
Age
Sex
Male
% within use/nonuse
Female
% within use/nonuse
Race
White
% within use/nonuse
Nonwhite
% within use/nonuse
Education
Less than HS
% within use/nonuse
HS
% within use/nonuse
More than HS
% within use/nonuse

159 (48.80%)
87.40%
23 (7.10%)
12.60%

93 (29.30%)
53.10%
82 (25.90%)
46.90%

5 (3.50%)
5.70%
21 (14.80%)
23.90%
62 (43.70%)
70.50%

122 (37.40%)
84.70%
22 (6.70%)
15.30%

122 (38.50%)
85.90%
20 (6.30%)
14.10%

0 (0.00%)
0%
19 (13.40%)
35.20%
35 (24.60%)
64.80%

0.921
0.492

38.581

0.001

4.747

0.093

3.799

0.15

64.465

0.001

13.80%
86.20%

67.80%
32.20%

3.50%
28.20%
68.30%

Marital
Married
% within use/nonuse
Single
% within use/nonuse
Other
% within use/nonuse

49 (28.50%)
49.00%
40 (23.30%)
40.00%
11 (6.4%)
11.00%

32 (18.60%)
44.40%
37 (21.50%)
51.40%
3 (1.70%)
4.20%

47.10%

Movement
Environmental
% within use/nonuse
Far-Right
% within use/nonuse
Islamic Extremist
% within use/nonuse

52 (15.70%)
28.40%
36 (10.90%)
19.70%
95 (28.70%)
51.90%

49 (14.80%)
31.30%
80 (24.20%)
54.10%
19 (5.70%)
12.80%

30.51%
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0.471

23.30%
8.10%

35.04%
34.44%

Table 3. Use Type Differences Between Terrorist Movements (n = 331)
Use
%/Use
Nonuse
%/Nonuse
Use Type
Communication
Environmental
36 (10.90%) 25.40%
65 (19.60%)
34.40%
Far-Right
20 (6.00%)
14.10%
96 (29.00%)
50.80%
Islamic
86 (26.00%) 60.60%
28 (8.50%)
14.80%
Info Gathering
Environmental
30 (9.10%)
25.40%
71 (21.50%)
33.30%
Far-Right
13 (3.90%)
11.00%
103 (31.10%) 48.40%
Islamic
75 (22.70%) 63.60%
39 (11.80%)
18.30%
Propaganda
Environmental
37 (11.20%) 34.60%
64 (19.30%)
28.60%
Far-Right
12 (3.60%
11.20%
104 (31.40%) 46.40%
Islamic
58 (17.50%) 54.20%
56 (16.90%)
25.00%
Planning
Environmental
24 (7.30%)
47.10%
77 (23.30%)
27.50%
Far-Right
-116 (35.00%) 41.40%
Islamic
27 (8.20%)
52.90%
87 (26.30%)
31.10%
Train
Environmental
24 (7.30%)
54.50%
77 (23.30%)
26.80%
Far-Right
-116 (35.00%) 40.40%
Islamic
20 (6.00%)
45.50%
94 (28.40%)
32.80%
Info Sharing
Environmental
24 (7.30%)
60.00%
77 (23.30%)
26.50%
Far-Right
9 (2.70%)
22.50%
107 (32.30%) 36.80%
Islamic
7 (2.10%)
17.50%
107 (32.30%) 36.80%
Claim
Environmental
40 (12.10%) 100.00%
61 (18.40%)
21.10%
Far-Right
-116 (35.0%)
39.90%
Islamic
-114 (34.40%) 39.20%
Target
Environmental
6 (1.80%)
54.50%
95 (28.70%)
29.70%
Far-Right
-116 (35.00%) 36.20%
Islamic
5 (1.50%)
45.50%
109 (32.90%) 34.10%
Recruitment
Environmental
20 (6.00%)
100.00%
81 (24.50%)
26.00%
Far-Right
-37.30%
116 (35.00%)
Islamic
-36.70%
114 (34.40%)
Cyber-Attack
Environmental
7 (2.10%)
100.00%
94 (28.40%)
29.00%
Far-Right
-116 (35.00%) 35.80%
Islamic
-114 (34.40%) 35.20%
Radicalization
Environmental
4 (1.20%)
66.70%
97 (29.30%)
29.80%
Far-Right
-116 (35.00%) 35.70%
Islamic
2 (.60%)
33.30%
112 (33.80%) 34.50%
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X2
82.62

p.
0.000

Cramer's V
0.5

76.91

0.000

0.48

44.41

0.000

0.36

32.53

0.000

0.31

29.18

0.000

0.30

18.8

0.000

0.24

103.61

0.000

0.56

6.54

0.038

0.14

48.47

0.000

0.38

16.29

0.000

0.22

4.76

0.092

0.12

Table 4. Logistic Regression Models Estimating Internet Usage (n = 331)

Age
Sex
Race
Mstat
Mstat 1
Mstat 2
Islamic
Environmental
Far-Right

Model 1
-0.008
-0.631
1.681

O.R.
0.992
0.532
5.315

Model 2
0.006
-0.377
0.527

O.R.
1.006
0.686
1.693

-0.057
1.011

0.945
2.749

-0.322
0.958

0.725
2.605

-0.461
-1.678

0.631
0.187

Constant
0.685
1.261
DF
5
7
R-Squared (Nagelkerke)
0.164
0.227
Reference Categories: Islamic Extremist, Female, Less Than High School, Married, White

increased from 16 to 23 percent. Again, after controlling for all other variables, users are less
likely to be female, almost two times more likely to be white, and almost three times more likely
to be married. However race is not significant in model 2. Finally, the results show that while
environmental terrorist are not significantly different than Islamic extremists in ICT usage, there
is a statistically significant difference between Islamic extremists and the far-right movements
with far-right terrorists using ICT significantly less than Islamic extremists. Clearly, these
movements have differences and this preliminary analysis points to some important findings
worthy of more detailed analyses that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Discussion
Little evidence of self-radicalization or recruitment occurring online among Islamic
extremists was found within this particular sample. In fact, using ICTs to recruit members
domestically appeared to be most prominent among environmental movements. In addition, no
strategic use of social networking sites (SNSs) among Islamic extremists was found. Again, the
only evidence of strategic use of SNSs was recorded among environmental terrorists. It appears
that, at least in terms of domestic terrorism, these uses are not as prevalent as what might have
been assumed. As suggested earlier, the majority of information was taken from the FBI
investigations and there is the potential that the ICT use was either well hidden, undetected, or
not pertinent to establishing probable cause in an indictment. Such activity may have occurred
but it was simply not mentioned in any court documents.
As indicated, ICTs are prevalently used by terrorist movements for reasons practical to
their unique operational and ideological needs. Islamic extremists recorded the most prevalence
in ICT usage. Nevertheless, many of the usage forms often associated with Islamic movements,
were found to be more closely associated with environmental movements in this analysis. This
underscores the point that not all terrorist movements are alike in terms of ICT usage, among
other factors, and should not be lumped into a single category. Consequently, this brings into
light the overshadowing focus on Islamic threats, as well as the importance of understanding
what differences drive ICT usage–and other planning activities for that matter–across
movements and why. The significant differences in ICT use among these terrorist movements
exposed are likely driven by the exclusive characteristics and needs of each movement.
Furthermore, while the demographics of older, less educated far-right members who used less in
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the overall sample coincide with the demographic correlates among the general population of
nonusers, the story is clearly more complicated.
Overall, the demographic correlates of ICT users were difficult to separate from both
nonusers and the entire sample of terrorists. This makes it difficult to infer any specific typology
of an ICT “user” or “nonuser” other than middle-aged, white, married, well-educated male
profile typical of the findings pertaining to the majority of terrorists in general. The age of user
and nonusers being relatively the same illustrates the point that while organizational and
philosophical needs may drive different operational planning strategies, terrorists in general may
be similar in various ways, such as demographics, yet much different from the general or
criminal population. Furthermore, even though the majority of users were white, that percentage
was not much more than nonwhite users. Likewise, within users and nonusers, although ICT
users were slightly more educated, nonusers were also highly educated. This further supports the
research findings that terrorists differ from the general and/or criminal population in terms of
demographics. Married individuals are more likely to use, but yet again, that percentage is only
slightly higher than singles, making it difficult to infer specific predictors. Ultimately, analysis of
a larger population of terrorists is needed to further assess demographics in relationship to ICT
usage.
Although occurring with slightly less frequency, the same practical needs seem to also
drive ICT use among environmental terrorists for communication, information gathering, the
distribution of propaganda, and planning. Nevertheless, environmental movements take
prevalence over Islamic and far-right movements for the rest of the use type variables: training,
information sharing, target selection, recruitment, cyber-attacks, threatening, web-creation,
publicity, and radicalization. It should be noted that several of these use types–claiming
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responsibility, website-creation, recruitment, and cyber-attacks–were unique to environmental
cases in this study. In the sample, twice as many individuals were radicalized, three times as
many individuals were sharing information, and seven times as many individuals were using
ICTs to gain publicity than Islamic extremists as were used by environmental movements.
Although the “ELF Family” was systematically dismantled by criminal agency investigations in
the late 90s and early 2000s, it is clear that this movement and associated environmental
movements have set a precedent of ways to operate using ICTs (Smith and Damphousse 2009).
While the focus has been mainly upon movements like Al-Qa’ida, specific movements may
adopt ICT use to meet the particular needs of the movement. Their strong Internet presence may
again reflect their organizational constraints or needs. Although far-right users were less
prevalent in most cases, it should be again noted that the far-right leaderless resistance was
organized around the idea of using ICTs to facilitate protection of movement leaders from civil
and criminal liability (Beam, 1992; Kaplan, 1997). Far-right use for communication was
comparable to environmental movements. Their information sharing was equivalent to that of
Islamic extremists. Finally, the far-right used the Internet more for both threatening and publicity
than Islamic extremists. It is distinctly evident that these movements use the Internet differently.
Finally, just as demographic differences dictate the opportunity to access and skills to
operate ICTs, the same may hold true for macro-level differences. The diverse backgrounds of
individuals comprising the aforementioned movements, combined with the varying background
characteristics of the movements themselves, may work confluent in producing outcomes in ICT
usage. Beyond the practicality of culturally driven needs of communication and
news/information sharing, the general public’s drive to use ICTs for social interaction and escape
make them formidable psychological tools to reach vulnerable populations; however, little
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evidence of this was found. Nevertheless, as research expands, demographics may partly
determine which individuals are online for indoctrination, to be recruited, or even radicalized.
Such constraints may likely translate into certain populations perceiving online propaganda as
culturally resonant, and accordingly those populations may be targeted. As the IT-driven era and
information age continue to expand, the attributes and attraction of seemingly troubled
individuals to these technologies may proffer the expansion of ICT use among individuals
experiencing grievances, terrorists seeking to reach those experiencing those grievances, or
simply networking to spread ideology or recruit.

Conclusion
Although little evidence of online radicalization or self-radicalization was found, the
precedent set by environmental movements and their ICT usage emphasizes that the Internet and
associated technologies cannot be discounted as viable terrorist tools. Practically, ICTs are
clearly tools and extensions of social movements, their operations, and their ideologies. ICTs are
an integral part of the pre-incident planning process, assessing information and sharing it.
Moving into and through an IT-driven era, reliance on such technological tools is likely to
become more prevalent for social groups and movements in the future. Currently, social
scientists have a unique opportunity to study the convergence of our social world with these
technologies. The fact that Al-Qa’ida and Islamic extremists have overshadowed public and
government concern about other movements attests to the social construction of terrorism in the
United States after 9/11. Clearly, other terrorist threats have remained prominent but out of the
media and public sphere’s concern. The other movements in this study are clearly different from
Islamic extremists in terms of their use, their message, and their organizational needs.
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Accordingly, other movements have the same opportunity to use ICTs and models for such usage
have been set by groups such as environmental movements.
Finally, this study should bring to light many questions as to how terrorists, at least
domestically, are currently using ICTs to plan terrorist incidents and the threats associated with
such use. As society as a whole becomes more reliant on ICTs, social scientists have a
responsibility to assess and measure both its social uses and effects. While use for socializing
and radicalizing individuals online remains a threat, the results from this analysis stress the need
to understand the fundamental needs and philosophies behind terrorist movements, how they
differ, and how these differences translate in to different uses of ICTs as social tools to advance
their causes. The threat clearly comes from practical, everyday use, and at least for now, it
appears that socialization and radicalization of terrorist movement members still occurs in groups
with the facilitation and indoctrination of other group members.
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